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lakces and streams, and generally to restore the use and enjoy-
ment of the lands.3 6
None of these statutes has been held invalid3 7 and if a
court should find one unconstitutional it would seem to be a
clear, invasion of the legislative function, under the color of
substantive due process.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSIDERATION OF FACTS IN DUE PROCESS CASES
In Department of Insurance v. Schoonover, 72 N.E.2d
747 (Ind. 1947), a provision of the Indiana Insurance Law of
1935,1 which restricted the selling of fire and casualty in-
surance in Indiana to agents employed on a commission basis
only, was declared unconstitutional. Schoonover, an agent
employed on salary, was refused a license to sell insurance
by the Department of Insurance. He brought an action seek-
ing to enjoin the Department from limiting the issuance of
licenses for fire and casualty insurance to agents employed
solely on a commission basis.2 He contended that the statute
deprived him of his right to work or such terms as he might
freely secure; that the statute made a discriminatory classifi-
cation between salaried and commission agents; and that it
therefore violated the due process3 and equal protection' pro-
visions of the Indiana Constitution and the Fourteenth
36. Ind. Acts 1941, c. 68, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) § 46-
1501. Cf., Ops. Att'y Gen., Ind. (1943) p. 301: "The real purpose
of the statute is not so much to encourage strip mining, but to
make sure that on land where strip ipining had already been done
the Conservation Commission would see to it that the land
would be restored to usefulness again and reforested."
37. Neither the Indiana nor the West Virginia statutes have been
challenged. The Ohio statute was not efective until 1948. The
Pennsylvania statute was held constitutional as a valid classifica-
tion and not a denial of due process, in Dufour v, Maize, -A.2d-
(Pa. January 19, 1948).
1. Ind. Acts 1935, c. 162, § 209(a), Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl.
1940) § 39-4501 (a).
2. The Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., which had previously em-
ployed agents on salary in Indiana, was joined as party plaintiff.
The Indiana Association of Insurance Agents, an association of
agents on commission (comprising about 85 per cent of the insur-
ance agents in the state), were joined as party defendants and
for all practical purposes defended the action; the Attorney Gen-
eral joined in all motions, etc., for the purpose of getting a de-
termination of the cause.
3. Ind. Const. Art. I, § 1.
4, Ind, Const, Art. I § 23,
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Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The
trial court admitted the testimony of experts, statistical data
and similar evidence. On the part of plaintiffs this tended
to show that salaried agents not only gave satisfactory ser-
vice to their clients, but could offer cheaper premiums be-
cause of savings realized through that manner of payment.
For defendants it tended to show that the legislature could
reasonably have believed that connissioned agents gave fuller
coverage and better service.- The trial court held that the
statute violated all of the constitutional provisions pleaded
and issued the injunction.
On appeal the Supreme Court was thus presented with
a fairly complete record bearing on the reasonableness of
the legislation. Reverting to an old line of cases, 6 the court
declared that the evidence at the trial was not properly
received. 7 The constitutionality of a statute involving an
5. The trial court refused, however, to allow a witness for defend-
ant, who was Insurance Commissioner at the time of the enact-
ment of the Insurance Code, to testify orally as to the legislative
background of the Code, and this was assigned as error on appeal.
This evidence might have been admitted and received judicial notice
notice if it had been in documentary form. "For the purpose of
passing upon the constitutionality of a statute the court may resort
to public official documents, public records, both state and national,
and may take judicial notice of and consider the history of the le-
gislation and the surrounding facts and circumstances in connection
therewith." Boshuizen v. Thompson and Taylor Co., 360 Ill. 160,
163, 195 N.E. 625,626 (1935). This points to the need in state
legislatures of committee reports and records such as accompany
Congressional action.
6. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Hartford City, 170 Ind. 674,
82 N.E. 787 (1907), rehearing denied, 85 N.E. 362 (1908); Van-
dalia R. R. v. Stilwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N.E. 289 (1914); Pitts-
burgh R. R. v. State, 180 Ind. 245, 102 N.E. 25 (1913); Pitts-
burgh R. R. v. State, 178 Ind. 498, 99 N.E. 801 (1912); State v.
Barett, 172 Ind. 169, 87 N.E. 7 (1909); Hovey v. Foster, 118 Ind.
502, 21 N.E. 39 (1888). Contra: Weisenberger v. State, 202 Ind.
424, 175 N.E. 238 (1930) (dismissed by the court as not being
exhaustively reasoned on the point).
7. The general admissibility of evidence had not been discussed by
either party in the appeal briefs. In denying petition for rehear-ing the court said it was not its intention "to give the impression
that the parties litigant were precluded from bringing to the at-
tention of the trial court facts to establish the existence of thosenatters of which the court will take judicial notice." This clari-
fied the situation little. The court cited 9 Wigmore, "Evidence"
§ 2568a. (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore points out that the judge may or
may not rely on the materials offered by counsel. A footnote
to the section reads: "The question of the method of informing
the Court on facts relevant to the constitutionality of a statute
is in need of special and frank consideration; . . ."
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exercise of the police power 8 was held to be a question of
law, "resort being had to extrinsic considerations only to the
extent that the facts are, or may become, a matter of ju-
dicial knowledge." The court without apparent resort to the
record found that the statute had no reasonable relation to
the police power, and held it violated the due process clause
of the Indiana Constitution.9 The equal protection point was
not passed on; and raising a federal question was carefully
avoided by restricting the decision to the state constitution.'0
A problem presented by the Schoonover case is the ex-
tent to which facts are admissible to determine the constitu-
tionality of legislation in due process cases. The Indiana
court has expounded a principle which applies generally to
any litigation-that of judicial notice-and so in effect, has
given narrow scope to an inquiry into the constitutionality
of legislation. It is important to determine if such a narrow
evidenciary rule for constitutional cases is valid.
In these cases courts are faced with two apparently con-
flicting concepts of our system of law: (1) Courts will not
inquire into the wisdom of legislative policy-making; 1 and
(2) Where a statute clearly violates constitutional rights, the
courts will declare it invalid.12 Yet an invocation of the
8. A problem closely akin to the consideration of facts in due pro-
cess cases is that in relation to the Commerce Clause. Where a
state statute enacted under the police power is challenged as vio-
lating the Commerce Clause; i.e., that it regulates some subject
which admits only of a uniform federal regulation, the question
is one of reasonableness, to the determination of which facts
are material and admissible. Southern Pac. Co. v. Ariz. 325 U.S.
711 (1944).
9. Supra n. 8.
10. This presents a sharp dilemma for trial lawyers in Indiana courts.
By this decision it is erroneous for a trial court to admit extrinsic
evidence on the constitutionality of a statute, yet a case will be
remanded for failure to present a complete record under U.S.
Supreme Court decisions. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin,
293 U.S. 194 (1934). How a party could get a determination by
the highest court in the land on the constitutionality of a statute,
assuming a federal question is raised, without the necessity of
two trials is a serious question. In Indiana courts counsel should
not overlook the possibility of a Brandeis Brief in any case where
material is available. See n. 7 supra. On the Brandeis Brief, see
Muller v. Ore., 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
11. Olsen v. Neb., 313 U.S. 236,246 (1941); German Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389,414 (1913); Booth v. State, 179 Ind.
405,412, 100 N.E. 563,566 (1912); Jamison v. Ind. Natural Gas
& Oil Co., 128 Ind. 555,561, 28 N.E. 76,78 (1891).
12. Powell v. Pa., 127 U.S. 678,686 (1887); Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137,176 (U.S. 1803) ; Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336,385, 99
N.E. 1,19 (1912).
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latter rule is not an encroachment on the former, for the
court is deciding that the statute violates constitutional guar-
antees, the protection of which is paramount to the end
which the legislature sought in passing the statute. The
holding of the court is not that the legislature was unwise
in its choice of policy, but rather, unwise in attempting to
place the chosen policy above constitutional guarantees. Such
an explanation goes to the roots of our system of government,
and serves to show the distinction between judicial and legis-
lative function which has persisted from the time of Chief
Justice Marshall, though admittedly not without variance in
degree and resultant confusion.
Irrespective of the explainable harmony of these con-
cepts, the difficult derivative question is how courts proceed
when deciding the constitutionality of statutes.13  Courts uni-
formly declare that a statute passed by the legislature under
the guise of the police power is presumed to be valid,'4 and
will not be struck down unless it has no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.5 To
13. The premise of this note is that courts will review legislation on
the basis of its reasonableness, a policy to which Indiana and
most courts seem committed. Another possible view, and a mi-
nority position on the U.S. Supreme Court, approaches "no review
at all," at least not in a case where it appears the legislature
gave the statute due consideration. See Mr. Justice Black (dissent-
ing), Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5,10 (1938). The presumption
of constitutionality and consideration of facts are problems in-
extricably interwoven. To couch Justice Black's position in terms
of presumption, there is a "strong" presumption of constitution-
ality, or an "almost irrebuttable" presumption. Thus Indiana's
position in not admitting evidence would be sound but for the
consideration that they are reviewing the statute, and upon the
basis of its reasonableness, and facts are an absolute necessity
to that type of proceeding.
14. Mr. Warsoff in "The Weight of the Presumption of Constitution-
ality Under the Fourteenth Amendment" has outlined the per-
iodically varying weight accorded to the presumption in the U.S.
Supreme Court and concludes that it is "nothing more than a
convenient device to be used to support a favored statute, or an
empty phrase to, be employed in passing deference before pro-
ceeding to recite facts -which destroy the validity of the legislation
in question." 18 B. U. L. Rev. 319 (1938). "The force of the
presumption varies inversely with the extent of the court's know-
ledge in favor of the statute." Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. 283 (1936).
See Note, "The Presentation of Facts Underlying the Constitu-
tionality of Statutes," 49 Harv. L. Rev. 631 (1936); Note, 31
Col. L. Rev. 1136 (1931).
15. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105,111 (1928). This note
does not consider equal protection cases where the existence of
a reasonably conceivable state of facts sustaining a classification
made by the legislature will be presumed. E.g., Baldwin v. State,
194 Ind. 303,307, 141 N.E. 343,345 (1923). There would seem
19481
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determine if a statute has a reasonable relation to the police
power they "look to the character and reasonableness of the
limitation."',. If courts may look to the reasonableness of
a limitation,'1 what better source is there than the facts
which the legislature thought gave the measure a substan-
tial relation to the police power?18 Certainly the principle is
well established that the legislature may regulate business
for the economic welfare of the public.19 The insurance
business in particular is subject to a large degree of regula-
tion20 by the states,2' as are insurance agents.22  But judges,
by their devotion to the law, are precluded from having ex-
tensive knowledge of practices and theories of every business
which may be involved in litigation before them. The in-
adequacy of judicial notice to deal with such matters has
been pointed out by numerous writers.23  An enlightened re-
to be little distinction in equal protection and due process cases,
however, in the context here considered. A reasonableness question
in either type case can best be answered by resort to the facts.
16. Department of Insurance v. Schoonover, 72 N.E.2d 747 (Ind.
1947); Weisenberger v. State, 202 Ind. 424, 175 N.E. 238 (1930);
Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
17. The writer in Note, 30 Col. L. Rev. 360 (1930) suggests that
there are four elements in the analysis of the reasonableness of
a statute: "the conditions existing prior to the legislation, the ef-
fectiveness of the new rule to improve them, the deprivation result-
ing from the new rule, and the possibility of achieving the same
benefits at a lower price. The legislature in effect reaches a
conclusion as to all these matters of fact. All of them are perti-
nent to the judicial question whether that conclusion is so un-
reasonable that it must be set aside."
18. The court must be "... informed as to the truth of some question
of fact which the statute postulates or with reference to which
it is to be applied; and the validity of the legislation depends
on the conclusions reached by the court with reference to this
question of fact." Bikle, "Judicial Determination of Questions
of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Ac-
tion," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 6 (1924).
19. See discussion of Indiana cases, Twomley, "The Indiana Bill of
Rights," 20 Ind. L. J. 211, 218, 220 (1945); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (valid under the 14th Amendment);
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (un-
der Commerce Clause); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,537
(1934).
20. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); Attorney
General v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 310 Mass. 762,765, 39 N.E.
2d 664,667 (1942).
21. See "Indiana Legislation-1947, Insurance," 22 Ind. L. J. 364
(1947).
22. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1930).
23. E.g., Bikle, supra n. 18, at 21; Barnett, "External Evidence of
the Constitutionality of Statutes," 3 Ore. L. Rev. 195,205 (1924).
The U. S. Supreme Court's procedure of calling for facts in
NOTES
view is impossible in many cases without an examination of
the evidence;24 and the court's judgment in such cases
should be based on a complete record in order to command
the public support.25.
That the validity of a statute may be based oil facts
established by the evidence 2 is now thoroughly settled in the
United States Supreme Court,2 but is a point on which
state courts differ.28  In Weisenberger v. State29 Indiana
seemed to be following the lead of the Supreme Court. The
court there decided that a statute forbidding the use of
"shoddy" in renovating mattresses was a valid exercise of
the police power if it applied only to the use of unsanitary
"shoddy." The evidence failed to establish that "shoddy"
could not safely be used if properly cleansed. It might be
argued that the court was only considering evidence for the
purpose of finding the legislative intent.30 However, the
rule admitting evidence was quoted from the Supreme Court
case of Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 31 a direct holding that
facts are admissible to determine a statute's constitutional-
constitutional cases "recognizes the truth that what a particular
court may judicially know does not necessarily comprehend all facts
pertinent to the issue." Judicial notice should be used "only
where the matter clearly falls within the domain of the indisput-
able." Morgan, "Judicial Notice," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269,291,292(1944).
24. Barnett, supra n. 23; Note, 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 82,86,87 (1931).
25. Blkle, supra n. 18, at 27.
26. In the U.S. Supreme Court at least, facts are brought to the
attention of the Court by the presentation of competent legal
proof in confornmity with the rules of evidence, in the form of the
Brandeis Brief (matters of general knowledge and belief), by a
legislative declaration of public conditions, by committee reports,
and by a finding of fact by the highest state court, in addition
to those accorded judicial notice. Warsoff, supra n. 14, at 322.
27. Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); U.S. v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1937); see note on this point, 82 L.
Ed. 1244 (1937). A recent case going deep into the underlying
fact situation of a statute is Kotch v. Board of River Port Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552 (1946).
28. Note, supra n. 27; Wilson, "Consideration of Facts in Constitu-
tional Cases," 17 So. Calif. L. Rev. 335,338,339 (1944).
29. 202 Ind. 424, 175 N.E. 238 (1930), 6 Ind. L. J. 564 (1931).
30. The court's duty is to avoid a construction of a statute which would
make it unconstitutional if that construction can reasonably be
given it. See, e.g., Miles v. Department of Treasury, 209 Ind.
172,184, 199 N.E. 372,377 (1935); Peabody Coal Co. v. Lamber-
mont, 220 Ind. 525,529, 44 N.E.2d 827,828 (1942). This is a mat-
ter not within the scope of this note.
31. 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
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ity.32 That indicates the Indiana court intended a like ap-
plication and scope for the rule. 3 But it appears that phase
of the Weisenberger case is now overruled. 4
If the law is to remain as declared in the principal case
it would seem that the court validly excepted rate cases.35
The questions presented in the instant case are questions of
the power of the legislature to act at all, while in rate cases,
the power being conceded, the question is whether the party is
in fact unreasonably deprived of property or due process by
the rate established. Even admitting this distinction, the
facts on which the power to regulate depends are no less ma-
terial than the facts on which the reasonableness of a given
rate is predicated, and no reason is seen why courts should
consider them in the one case and not in the other. A ration-
al conclusion is impossible in either situation without ade-
quate factual support.36
Two reasons are urged by some courts against the exam-
ination of evidence in these cases: (1) It is claimed that
the legislature is in a better position to deal with such
evidence than the courts-that courts cannot review facts
on which the legislature is presumed to have passed ;37 and
(2) That it would result in an instability of the law because
the fate of a statute would depend on the character of the
case first presented to the court.38 It is submitted that the
first objection grows out of confusion of the two "apparently
conflicting concepts" mentioned earlier. Granting that the
legislature is in a better position to deal with such evidence
as they do deal with it, "the scope of a judicial inquiry in
deciding the question of power is not to be confused with
32. "The answer depends on the facts of the case .... Invalidity may
be shown by things which will be judicially noticed . . . or by
facts established by evidence." Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270
U.S. 402,410 (1926).
33. The then Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court considered
the Weisenberger case a landmark case. Address to the Bar,
7 Ind. L. J. 31 (1931).
34. It is noted in passing that the principal case quotes another pas-
sage from the Weisenberger case with approval: ". . . courts may
look to the character and reasonableness of the limitation . . . I)
and in looking to the reasonableness the court there admitted
evidence.
35. Cf. Barnett, supra n. 23, at 204.
36. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194,210 (1934).
37. Hovey v. Foster, 118 Ind. 502,508, 21 N.E. 39,41 (1889).
38. Pittsburgh R.R. v. State, 180 Ind. 245,252, 102 N.E. 25,28 (1913);
see Barnett, supra n. 23, at 203.
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the scope of legislative considerations in dealing with the
matter of policy."39 In considering evidence in constitutional
cases courts are not reviewing facts in the same sense that
the legislature passed upon them. They are not debating
conflicting theories as did the legislature, but are directing
their inquiry to whether the legislature had a reasonable
theory to support the regulation. The second objection arises
from a misconception of the nature of the facts admitted
under the Supreme Court rule.40 Those facts admitted bear-
ing on the reasonableness of the limitation are not directed,
as in the rate cases, merely to a showing that its application
to a particular party is invalid, but to the existence or non-
existence of a rational theory sustaining the legislation as
to all parties affected by it. 41
The weight of the presumption of constitutionality in
Indiana after the Schoonover case is uncertain. In cases
cited by the court in the principal case 42 the presumption was
employed to uphold statutes in the face of invalidating evi-
dence which the court refused to consider. Here the court
tips its hat to the presumption in passing, and refuses evi-
dence supporting the statute. The tenor of the decision sug-
gests Lochner v. New York4l3 and the "side-by-side" test
where the constitution and the statute are laid together and
the judge decides which should prevail.44  No recent authori-
ties have been found favoring the view adopted by the court
in the Schoonover case;45 critics and authors favor the Su-
preme Court rule.46 It is believed that business interests and
increased regulation have become too complex for an out-
moded judicial notice to give legislation a fair trial, and that
frank adoption of the factual evidence rule in constitutional
cases will lead to less confusion in the law and procedure
than the happenstance of judicial notice.47
39. Chicago R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549,569 (1911).
40. Compare Carolene Products Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 18 (1944), with
U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1937).
41. See cases cited in Note, supra n. 27.
42. Cases cited n. 6 supra.
43. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
44. See Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
45. Cf. at earlier dates Notes, 14 L.R.A. 459 (1891); L.R.A. 1915D
458; 6 R.C.L. 112-5 (1915).
46. Articles and Notes cited supra notes 14, 17, 18, 23, 28.
47. See Morris, "Law and Fact," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303,1321,1325
(1942). See also a recent state decision well reasoned on the
point, Ritholz v. Johnson, 244 Wis. 494, 12 N.W.2d 738 (1944).
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